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ABSTRACT 
China‟s increasing integration with the world economy is met with much anticipation 
and much anxiety in the Southeast Asian region. In Indonesia, there is intense interest in 
Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI), not only among academics but also among 
policy makers, industrialists and the general public. So much more surprising is the fact 
that no systematic study of Chinese FDI in Indonesia has been undertaken to date. The 
current paper contributes to filling this gap and analyses the current composition as well 
as the historical evolution of Chinese FDI in Indonesia. Relying on a survey conducted 
in 2008 among Chinese invested enterprises supplemented with available official 
statistics and secondary data, the study finds that Chinese FDI in Indonesia is performed 
by mixed entities: some are owned by central government, some by regional 
government and some are private firms. In the case of joint ventures, their local partners 
are mostly local Chinese, except in the infrastructure, mining and energy sector where 
their local partners are Indonesian state-owned enterprises. Where the local 
developmental effects are concerned, a picture emerges where Chinese investments, at 
this early period of their internationalization, are likely to give rise to a more modest 
extent of positive spillovers than investor from more economically advanced countries. 
This stems from the sectors, investment motives and operational strategies of Chinese 
investors, the heritage of ethnic tension and segmentation of the economic system along 
ethnic lines in Indonesia, and the likelihood that Chinese MNCs as latecomers are more 
vertically integrated than their developed-country counterparts. Finally, considering the 
evolution of Chinese investments in Indonesia over time, investments have evolved 
from being individual and isolated projects to acquiring more systemic properties. 
Chinese companies have acquired a broader sectoral presence in Indonesia and Chinese 
invested companies in e.g. extractive or manufacturing activities can increasingly rely 
on complementary Chinese investments in logistics, travel, finance etc. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From an occasional trickle foreign direct investment from China to Indonesia has grown rapidly to 
make China the tenth largest investor in 2008. Not only have investment flows grown in size, they 
have also become more diversified, sectorally and in motives and operating modes. On the Chinese 
side, Chinese government and companies engage evermore actively in commercial relations with 
Southeast Asia. On the Indonesian side there is a strong and increasing interest in the extent and 
nature of Chinese business activities in the region. 
 
So much more surprising is it that to date no systematic study has been undertaken of Chinese 
investments in Indonesia. The current study set out to remedy this paucity of research. Through the 
provision of a more comprehensive and systematic overview of Chinese investments in Indonesia 
the study will also enable identification of stylized characteristics of Chinese investments in the 
country as well as an assessment of the local economic developmental effects. 
 
In the following we will first discuss the methodology applied and then account for the scarce 
existing literature on the subject. Next we will briefly discuss drivers of Chinese outward 
investments and then turn to a macro analysis of Chinese investment flows into Indonesia. The 
subsequent section accounts for the Indonesian policy environment vis-à-vis Chinese FDI. In the 
last section preceding the conclusion, statistics is provided for the firm-level survey of Chinese 
invested companies in Indonesia, which was conducted as part of the study. 
METHODOLOGY 
In this study Chinese FDI is defined as FDI from the People‟s Republic of China or mainland 
China, and excludes FDI from Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, or overseas Chinese living outside the 
country. It might take the form of a wholly owned capital investment or a joint venture with other 
investors. 
 
Throughout the study the principle of triangulation was applied to information collection. Rather 
than rely on any single source of data, information was generally sought from several different and 
independent sources allowing for more valid, reliable and robust results. Hence, among the sources 
of information relied upon were the following: primary data collected through a firm-level survey in 
Indonesia; interviews with managers and staff of Chinese invested companies in Indonesia; official 
statistics from international and national agencies; academic journals, books and papers; policy 
studies and reports; business, trade and daily press; expert interviews with academics, business 
associations, and Chinese embassy staff. 
 
Initially a number of leading scholars were consulted on the topic of Chinese outward investment 
and investments into Indonesia in specific.
ii
 Through these consultations it was also established that 
no comprehensive studies had yet been undertaken of Chinese FDI into Indonesia. Apart from 
scattered and anecdotal evidence in Indonesian and English language Indonesian media virtually no 
studies had been done of Chinese FDI in Indonesia. This was surprising given the traditionally 
strong interest in Indonesian academia, government, industry and general public in issues and 
activities related to China. 
  
Given the absence of data, statistics and studies on Chinese investments in Indonesia it was 
necessary to assemble and analyze a collection of primary data in order to establish more accurately 
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the extent and characteristics of Chinese FDI.  Two datasets in particular were constructed to this 
end: one based on official investment statistics and one based on a firm-level survey. 
Official investment statistics 
In order to establish the magnitude and sectoral and geographical composition of Chinese FDI into 
Indonesia, tabulated datasets were acquired from the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board 
(BKPM). Among BKPM‟s mandates is to issue licenses for foreign and domestic investment. The 
longitudinal datasets spanned the period from 1966, when BKPM was first established, up until 
2008. Sector was given according to two-digit ISIC code and location according to province. Both 
the number of investment projects and the investment values were given. BKPM records both 
approved and realized investment and while both datasets were acquired realized investment is the 
better foundation when probing the extent of Chinese FDI into Indonesia. These datasets are not 
publically available but were tabulated by BKPM specifically for this study. 
 
Care should be taken in the interpretation of official FDI statistics however, as there are many well-
known limitations and inaccuracies. Reporting and registration problems are abound, particularly in 
developing countries. For example, capital flight and portfolio flows are often misclassified, as is 
indirect outward investment by foreign affiliates. 
 
FDI is customarily broken down into three components: equity capital; inter-company loans, mainly 
from the principal to their overseas subsidiaries; and reinvested earnings. Whereas equity capital 
and inter-company loans are captured in balance of payment statistics reinvested earnings are not 
and can consequently lead to underestimation of FDI and inaccuracy of official statistics. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that companies have different inclination to reinvest their earnings, 
with companies having stayed long in the host economy and companies of US origin having a 
higher propensity to rely on reinvested earnings for example (Athukorala 2003). 
 
In the case of China in specific the problems are compounded by the fact that financial and non-
financial FDI are registered by different authorities, that FDI in financial services was only included 
from 2006, the issue of round-tripping through Hong Kong and the fact that the Chinese definition 
of FDI is different from the one recommended by IMF, e.g. by applying an ownership threshold 
level of 25 percent instead of 10 percent (UNCTAD 2007). Furthermore, many large mergers and 
acquisitions undertaken by Chinese companies are financed outside of China, possibly leading to a 
significant underestimation of Chinese investment abroad in official Chinese OFDI statistics 
(UNCTAD 2006). 
Firm-level survey 
Due to the absence of prior studies or data the choice was made to carry out a representative firm-
level survey rather than rely on a few case studies only. This was done well knowing that it would 
be difficult to persuade the companies to respond. On the other hand a national firm-level survey 
was previously carried out by one of the authors with good results, even though it was conducted 
under difficult circumstances at the peak of the Asian financial crisis (Gammeltoft 2003). 
Consequently, a survey was deemed to be difficult but not impossible to carry out. For the 
execution of the survey, in addition to the participation of Prof. Gammeltoft and Prof. Tarmidi, two 
fluent Mandarin-speaking student assistants were hired from the Department of Chinese Studies, 
University of Indonesia, Ms Seny Lewi and Ms Yuli Yao. Some Chinese executives would speak 
little or no English and thus Chinese language assistants were required. 
 
A survey questionnaire was elaborated and care was taken to make it as short and concise as 
possible. The English-language questionnaire was translated into both Indonesian and Mandarin and 
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to ensure accuracy back translations were performed and the results compared and aligned with the 
original version. Before administering the questionnaire, a pilot study was conducted by visiting a 
small number of companies and interviewing an appropriate executive or staff on the basis of the 
questionnaire with the purpose of testing out its formulation and design. 
 
Since BKPM does not release data, which allows individual firms to be identified, a directory of 
Chinese invested companies in Indonesia had to be constructed by other means. To this end the 
commercial business directory „Standard Trade & Industry Directory of Indonesia‟ published by PT 
Kompass Indonesia in Jakarta was purchased. It nominally provides complete coverage of firms in 
Indonesia and includes profiles with company name, address, phone and fax numbers, names of top 
executives, activities (sector), and lines of business. The companies which from their name or the 
names of their top executives appeared as possible Chinese subsidiaries were tentatively included in 
our directory. 
 
In Indonesia three business associations cater specifically for Chinese firms: the Chinese Business 
Association in Indonesia (CBAI), the China Committee of the Indonesian Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce (KADIN), and the Indonesia China Business Council (ICBC). The best data is provided 
by the Members Handbook of the CBAI, which contains information about firm name, cellular 
phone numbers of the chief executive and contact person, company phone and fax number, and line 
of activities, but no address. These three associations were contacted and their member directories 
were included in our directory.  
 
Chinese subsidiaries, which had been mentioned in Indonesian media, were also added to the 
directory along with cases identified in an earlier study by one of the authors (Tarmidi 2003). 
Finally, for the largest and most important Chinese MNCs, which were not already included in the 
directory, searches were made on their websites and the internet in general to establish whether or 
not they had subsidiaries in Indonesia. 
 
This resulted in a list with a total of 73 companies. It was likely that some firms on the list did in 
fact not have any Chinese capital, e.g. agents, importers and purely Indonesian firms with Chinese-
looking names for the company and its executives. These firms could be removed from the list 
when the companies were contacted later on. At this stage, some entries in the directory included 
only company name and telephone number; others only the company name. In these cases 
additional information was sought through the information service of the telephone operator and 
through the internet.  In a few cases no additional information could be acquired and we were left 
with only a telephone number and no postal address. 
 
In February 2009 the Indonesian and Chinese language questionnaires along with an introductory 
letter were sent to the 54 companies for which we had a postal address. The letters were sent with a 
private courier service, which is faster and more reliable than the public postal service. A small 
number of letters were returned due to erroneous address. About a week later, all companies for 
which we had a phone number were called up on the phone and the appropriate contact person 
sought out. Those who had received the questionnaire were encouraged to respond and those who 
had not were sent the questionnaire by post or fax. Companies were also given the option to respond 
directly over the phone, by email, or by receiving a personal visit by our assistants to help them fill 
out the questionnaire. Over the subsequent weeks the companies were called up repeatedly to 
encourage them to respond. Later on, due to a low response rate all firms in Jakarta were visited in 
person by the authors or the assistants, with or without an advance appointment. Further, an online 
web questionnaire was set up for the companies to use if they found the internet a more convenient 
media. 
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The survey was concluded in August 2009. At this point there were 87 companies in the directory. 
Of these, 14 had proven not to be Chinese FDI, e.g. companies which were merely agents or 
producing Chinese products on a license. Another 24 companies had been impossible to locate or 
contact in any way. In all likelihood these companies did not exist, e.g. companies which had 
ceased to exist or companies which had planned to invest but never did. This left us with a directory 
of 48 Chinese invested companies. Of these, 15 responded and the remainder refused. Even though 
the resulting response rate of 31 percent is very decent for this type of survey, the small absolute 
number of firms limits the types of analyses, which can be performed, as well as the 
generalizability. 
 
In addition to the survey, a number of companies were visited and interviews carried out with 
appropriate executives or staff. Company interviews were generally structured, based on the survey 
questionnaire, while allowing for open-ended excursions into especially interesting issues which 
might arise during the interview process. Interviews were also conducted with the Vice Chairman of 
the Chinese Business Association in Indonesia, staff at the Chinese embassy in Jakarta, the 
Secretary General of the Association of Indonesian Automotive Industries, and the Director General 
of the Indomobil Group, the second largest car producer in Indonesia. These interviews were open-
ended according to prepared flexible interview guides.  The Chinese Business Association 
representative spoke openly and in detail about the status and evolution of Chinese FDI in 
Indonesia. The Chinese embassy on the other hand did not want to give out information about 
individual Chinese firms in Indonesia.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In Southeast Asia there is a profound interest in the evolution of mainland Chinese overseas 
investments in the region. So much more surprising is the paucity of research and publications on 
the matter. That so little seems to be published in spite of the general interest is probably related to 
the fact that the inflows of FDI to Southeast Asia from China are still comparatively modest and 
that the topic is inherently difficult to research due to scarcity of reliable statistics, the extent of 
informal capital flows in overseas Chinese communities and that Chinese businesses abroad are 
often relatively reclusive. For Indonesia in specific, no comprehensive analyses of Chinese FDI in 
the country have been undertaken to date and only a few articles touch upon the subject. 
 
Foreign direct investment, i.e. investment by a company incorporated in one country into productive 
assets in another country with the aim of exerting control and reflecting a lasting interest, is 
generally considered a more stable and more virtuous source of development finance than portfolio 
flows. While disputes remain concerning the extent and character of developmental spillovers from 
FDI, spillovers are generally considered mediated through five different channels: demonstration, 
backward linkages, forward linkages, training, and competition. Local firms can imitate MNC 
affiliates and learn how to better procure, produce, sell, manage, and adapt technology. MNCs may 
build local supplier networks and work actively with suppliers to upgrade their product and process 
standards, creating a backward linkage effect. They may also link forward into distribution 
networks and directly to customers, supplying them with services related to their products. By 
training local employees who might later change workplace or otherwise share their knowledge 
locally, spillovers of skills can occur. Finally, MNCs may increase the level of competition in their 
sector and induce local companies to increase their productivity and product quality. 
 
Based on the industry surveys of Indonesia‟s national statistical bureau Takii (2007) analyses 
whether spillovers from FDI in Indonesia vary among investor home countries, distinguishing 
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between Japanese, other Asian, and non-Asian firms respectively. Takii notes that there has been a 
surge in FDI from emerging economies into Indonesia since the late 1980s and that a considerable 
amount of FDI has come from developing countries in eastern Asia. He finds that these investments 
were mainly export-market oriented, as opposed to the domestic-market oriented FDI in earlier 
protectionist periods: faced with appreciating currencies and rising wages companies relocated 
production abroad to maintain competitiveness.  Among the findings is that productivity spillovers 
from MNCs from Asian emerging economies are greater than those from developed-country MNCs. 
This supports the claim forwarded by Kokko (1994) and others that a wider technology gap can 
diminish spillovers. 
 
Using official statistics from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(MOFTEC) and other available data, Frost (2005) describes the extent and nature of recent Chinese 
FDI into Southeast Asia and discusses possible implications. He emphasizes that capital is often 
invested outside China through private channels and therefore omitted from official data, why the 
latter should be treated with caution as discussed earlier.  In terms of consequences of increasing 
Chinese FDI into the region Frost speculates it might have certain adverse effects on universal 
promotion of human rights and compliance with international labor standards. 
 
Thee (2006) analyzes investment flows from Northeast into Southeast Asia and how they have 
evolved in response to changing economic conditions in home countries and shifting policy 
positions in host countries. China is only sporadically dealt with as an outward investor, however. 
The paper details how foreign investment policies have varied over time in Southeast countries. 
Thee finds that with its large market, abundant and cheap labor supply, and natural resources 
Indonesia has good prospects of attracting more FDI, providing the general business climate is 
improved. 
 
Tarmidi (2003) analyzes a small number of companies in the motorcycle and electronics industries 
with Chinese partners. Given the case-based methodology the paper says little about the overall 
trends of Chinese investments in Indonesia. Yet, by providing details about specific Chinese 
invested companies it demonstrates the increasing involvement of Chinese investors in Indonesia, 
not only in resource extraction but also in manufacturing activities. 
 
A special characteristic for Chinese outward investments is that they can engage with the vast 
global overseas Chinese network. Investors can find business partnerships and form alliances more 
easily with communities sharing the same culture, tradition and language, and the overseas Chinese 
are generally successful in business and seen as trustworthy partners. Much has been written about 
the role of the Chinese diaspora and overseas Chinese networks in understanding both local 
economic dynamics within a variety of Asian countries and international exchange relationships 
between mainland China and other Asian countries. These networks are made up of reciprocal 
relationships (guanxi) built on trust (xinyong). 
 
Some authors consider the recognition of these networks pivotal to a proper understanding of 
contemporary economic affairs in most Asian countries (Redding 1993; Luo 2000). Other authors, 
however, argue that their influence is overstated and that ethnic Chinese economic communities, 
like others, are predominantly driven by motives of profit maximization and risk reduction (Gomez 
and Hsiao 2000; Yao 2002). Buckley et al. (2007) argue that the ability to tap into networks of 
overseas Chinese might be construed as an ownership-specific advantage and constitute a particular 
location-specific relational asset for Chinese firms. Certain ownership specific advantages are likely 
to be more pronounced among emerging economy MNCs, such as flexibility, economizing on 
capital and other resources, familiarity with operations in emerging economy institutional 
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environments, etc. and any ability to engage in trust-based reciprocal relations with pre-established 
and economically influential communities abroad would constitute a special relational asset for 
Chinese firms. Within these networks, market information about the most suitable and profitable 
investment opportunities can circulate with ease, fruitful commercial relationships can be 
established that facilitate market entry and development, and investment and commercial risk can 
be reduced (Buckley et al. 2007). 
 
On the basis of official government data on approved outward investment projects from China, 
Buckley et al. test the hypothesis by correlating the level of FDI from China with the proportion of 
ethnic Chinese in the host population. With a highly significant and positive coefficient in their 
multivariate analysis they find strong support for the hypothesis that familiarity between 
populations is important in the flow of Chinese FDI. It should be remembered, though, that while 
strong overseas Chinese networks can well make Chinese FDI operate differently than FDI from 
other countries, the importance of social networks in general is not alien to extant FDI theories, 
particularly not to network theory and the Uppsala model. 
 
It is especially important to consider the influence of overseas Chinese networks in an Asian 
context given that Asia is home to close to 90 percent of ethnic Chinese living outside of China. In 
1990 there were around 37 million overseas Chinese and two thirds of these were distributed more 
or less evenly among Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong SAR and Malaysia (Poston et al. 1994).  
 
Specifically in Indonesia, the role of ethnicity has been central to the shaping of the modern 
Indonesian economy. The number of Indonesians of Chinese origin is relatively low, probably 
around 3 percent of the total Indonesian population. With a total population in 2007 of around 226 
million, the Chinese population in Indonesia accounts for around 6.8 million people. These include 
Chinese descendants holding Indonesian citizenship, another small number with mainland China 
citizenship, and probably some with Taiwan citizenship. Today there are only few elderly Chinese 
left who were born in China, since there were no new waves of Chinese immigrants coming from 
China for the past 60 to 80 years. There is no exact data on the number of Chinese in Indonesia (see 
Tan 1979: ix)   
 
Though their number is small Indonesian Chinese have dominated Indonesian economic activities 
for many years, particularly after the colonial Dutch enterprises left the country in the late 50s. They 
are still a dominant player in the private sector today (Tan 1979: xiii-xviii; Ong Eng Die 1979; 
Suryadinata 1986). Most of them are active in the private sector because both in the past and today 
it has been difficult for them to work in government or join the army and police forces. 
 
Originating from the same ethnic group, sharing common cultural backgrounds, having a common 
language in Mandarin etc. it can be expected that Chinese foreign investors, if they form joint 
ventures with local partners, would prefer to choose Indonesian Chinese rather than indigenous 
firms as business partners (Tarmidi 2003: 203). Further, investment projects often grow out of 
business contacts established through business trips of Indonesian Chinese visits to mainland 
China.
iii
 
DRIVERS OF OUTWARD FDI FROM CHINA 
There are several important drivers of Chinese OFDI, the most important of which are gaining 
access to and building markets, securing natural resources, acquiring strategic assets, burgeoning 
foreign exchange reserves, proactive government policies, international competitive dynamics, and 
extra-productive motives. 
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When China embarked on allowing the outward flow of foreign direct investments during the 
period 1979-1983, it was politically driven primarily to search for natural resources to guarantee the 
fast growth of the domestic economy. Only state-owned trading and regional-based enterprises were 
allowed to invest abroad. But as time passed by and along with political change in China privately 
owned enterprises were increasingly allowed to invest abroad and the overseas investments became 
increasingly commercially oriented. This evolution is also reflected in the sectoral composition of 
outward FDI from first natural resources security based to the manufacturing sector and lately more 
to the knowledge-driven sectors. 
 
Today, most investments are made to access and develop markets abroad in response to, on the one 
hand, the increasing accessibility of these markets with global market liberalization and integration 
and, on the other hand, increasing foreign competition in domestic markets. In addition to acquiring 
natural resources and developing markets, gaining access to strategic assets such as technology, 
brands and distribution networks is increasingly a motive. As mentioned above efforts to secure 
access to natural resources have been a strong driver for Chinese investments, especially in Africa, 
and the three largest outward investing companies as measured by outward FDI stock are 
petrochemical companies (see Appendix 1). 
 
One respect in which Chinese MNCs tend to differ from their Western counterparts is by having 
less firm-specific advantages to support their internationalization. FDI is to a larger extent made 
with the intent to compensate for weaker firm-specific advantages or to acquire firm-specific 
advantages e.g. through acquisitions of firms abroad along with the technological assets they 
posses.  
 
Chinese multinationals are characterized by being large, by having entered the global economy 
relatively recently and almost all of them are state- or regional-owned enterprises. Most large 
Chinese companies are owned by central or local government and this applies equally to companies 
with investment abroad: going through the official list of China‟s 40 largest MNEs as measured by 
FDI stock, only four of these companies are not state owned (see Appendix 11). 
 
These multinationals are representing the activities of their mother companies in China within the 
confines of technological capabilities and quality standards. China‟s industrialization is 
characterized by being low-wage, low-tech, low-productivity manufacturing at the low end of 
global supply chain on the one hand, and high investment, high resource consumption and 
pollution, high exploitation, and high degree of foreign capital/trade dependency on the other‟ (Lin 
Chun 2007: 11). In contrast to multinationals from other developing countries, which operate in a 
limited number of foreign countries, Chinese multinationals operate in a large number of countries 
world-wide (compare Chan-Fishel and Lawson 2007: 64), similar to some South Korean large 
firms. The position of Chinese multinationals among developing countries was conspicuous: as of 
2001, out of the 50 largest multinational corporations from developing countries, China was 
represented by no less than 12 firms (Gammeltoft 2008: 19). 
 
The burgeoning Chinese foreign exchange reserve accumulated from a persistent trade balance 
surplus in itself brings about an inducement to invest abroad as a non-inflationary and productive 
outlet of funds. Traditionally these funds have been invested in US securities, particularly 
government bonds, also with the intent to support the value of the US dollar but investment 
strategies have become more activist, increasing the focus on direct investment vis-a-vis portfolio 
investments. 
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Chinese MNCs differ from their counterparts in other East Asian late-industrializing countries by 
not having been through an import-substituting period prior to their drive to internationalization. 
Companies in Japan, Korea, Taiwan and some extent Singapore were able to build up their 
capabilities in protected domestic markets before venturing abroad. Chinese companies on the other 
hand are exposed earlier to foreign competition at home and to the opportunities of global markets 
abroad. In other words, compared to companies in other Asian late-industrializing countries they 
have more opportunities to internationalize. At the same time foreign competition in home markets 
induce them to seek markets abroad and also give them a stronger incentive to seek assets abroad, 
which they can leverage to compete better at home. 
 
Even though Chinese outward investment has gradually moved from being policy-driven and 
government-led towards becoming more commercially-driven and enterprise-led, a significant 
element of policy inducement remains. Proactive government policies have helped push up Chinese 
FDI outflows, as discussed in the section ahead. 
INWARD FDI TO INDONESIA: RECENT TRENDS 
With its large population and wealth of natural resources Indonesia is an attractive destination for 
foreign investments. Though the income per capita is still relatively low, with rapid economic 
growth it promises a good prospective market for selling consumer goods. Because of the low level 
of wages, investors from more advanced economies are attracted to relocate their sunset industries 
to Indonesia to be more competitive in the world market. From here they can sell their products to 
the domestic market and export to other countries. However, due to internal economic, social and 
political conditions and instability, the business climate is less favorable so that many investors 
refrain from coming to Indonesia (see Schill 2007).  
 
Table 1  Realised Foreign Direct Investments by Selected Country, 2006 – Jan/Febr   2009 (number 
of projects and USD million) 
 2006 2007 2008 Jan/Febr 2009 
 P Value P Value P Value P Value 
China 11 32 22 29 27 140 7 8 
Malaysia 36 408 56 217 74 363 8 7 
Singapore 81 508 124 3,748 184 1,487 26 41 
Japan 113 903 113 618 130 1,365 17 67 
South Korea 140 476 164 628 182 301 31 214 
Taiwan 36 64 33 470 35 69 3 1 
Netherlands 24 35 36 147 34 90 7 61 
United Kingdom 49 661 63 1,686 57 513 8 121 
U.S.A. 32 66 31 145 35 151 6 2 
Australia 23 9 26 195 34 36 2 7 
Total 869 5,992 982 10,341 1,138 14,871 176 1,531 
Notes: P =  Number of projects; Value = Value in USD million 
Source: BKPM, August 2009 
 
During the past three years, from 2006 to 2008, the trend of the total number of realised projects has 
increased quite significantly from 869 projects to 1,138 projects (see Table 1).
iv
 And the value of 
investments also increased drastically to two and a half fold during the three-year period from 
USD6 billion to USD14.9 billion respectively. In terms of number of projects in 2008, Singapore 
with 184 projects ranked number one, followed closely by Korea with 182 projects while Japan 
ranked third with 130 projects. China, though on the increase, realized only 27 projects and ranked 
10. 
 
 11 
In terms of investment value in 2008, Singapore ranked first with USD1,487 million followed 
closely by Japan with USD1,365 million, and far behind on the third place by the United Kingdom 
with USD513 million. China ranked 7 in terms of investment value, though the trend was increasing 
rapidly, from 11 investment projects with a value of USD32 million in 2006 to 27 with a value of 
USD140 million. 
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Table 2  Realised Foreign Direct Investments by Sectors, 2006 – Jan/Febr 2009 
 2006 2007 2008 Jan/Febr 2009 
 P Value P Value P Value P Value 
1.Food crops & plantation 13 352 16 219 10 147 9 199 
2.Livestock 7 19 7 46 1 5 2 24 
3.Forestry 1 31 - - - - - - 
4.Fishery 5 33 5 25 3 2 - - 
5.Mining 13 99 34 310 41 181 6 172 
6.Food processing 45 354 53 704 42 491 4 116 
7.Textile 61 424 63 132 67 210 10 20 
8.Leather goods & footwear 11 52 10 96 20 146 3 13 
9.Wood 18 59 17 128 19 120 6 14 
10.Paper & printing 16 747 11 673 15 295 3 5 
11.Chemical & pharmaceutical 32 265 32 1,612 42 628 4 917 
12.Rubber & plastic 33 113 36 158 50 272 9 13 
13.Non-metallic minerals 7 95 6 28 11 266 1 0.2 
14.Metal, machinery & electronics 86 955 99 714 141 1,281 13 18 
15. Medical, optical instruments, watches & clocks 1 0.2 1 11 7 16 1 1 
16.Motor vehicles & transport equipment 28 439 38 412 47 756 8 50 
17.Other industries 25 117 24 30 34 35 3 4 
18.Electricity, gas & water supply 3 105 3 119 4 27 - - 
19. Construction 18 144 16 448 21 427 3 385 
20.Trade & repair 266 434 312 483 375 582 60 112 
21.Hotel & restaurants 31 111 22 136 22 157 5 43 
22.Transport, storage & communication 37 647 43 3,305 35 8,530 7 11 
23.Real estate, industrial estate & business activities 16 254 8 65 19 175 - - 
24.Other services 96 144 126 489 112 123 27 52 
Total 869 5,992 982 10,341 1,138 14,871 176 1,971 
Notes: P =  Number of projects; Value = Value in USD million 
Source: BKPM, August 2009
 13 
Looking at the distribution of realized FDI into Indonesia according to economic sectors 
(Table 2), in 2008 the sector trade and repair saw the most activity in terms of number of 
investments with 375 projects, followed by the metal, machinery and electronics industry on 
the second place with 141 projects, and the textile industry ranked third with 67 projects. In 
terms of investment value, the largest capital investment by far was undertaken in the sector 
transport, storage and communication, amounting to USD8.5 billion. Next in ranking on the 
second place came the metal, machinery and electronics industry with USD1.3 billion, 
followed by the motor vehicle and transport equipment industry with USD756 million, the 
chemical and pharmaceutical industry with USD628 million, trade and repair with USD582 
million. The fastest growing sector in terms of investment value during the period 2006-2008 
was the sector transport, storage and communication, which increased from USD647 million 
investment value to USD8,530 million, though the number of projects declined slightly from 
37 to 35. 
 
European investments in Indonesia tend to focus on covering the domestic market for selling 
their products and services. On the other hand wealthy Asian nations concentrate more on 
using Indonesia as their export-oriented production base of manufacturing like garments and 
consumer electronics, and Americans on oil and gas exploration and mining activities (Schill 
2007).  
Chinese foreign investments in Indonesia 
Indonesia‟s economy is dominated by ethnic Chinese which makes the country attractive to 
multinationals from China. Many Indonesian Chinese still speak Chinese, and as by now all 
of them were born in Indonesia, they know the local market and conditions well. On the other 
hand, many expat mainland Chinese do not yet speak English well.  
 
Multinationals from industrialized countries and newly industrializing economies relocate 
their labor-intensive low-technology sunset industries to low-wage developing countries to 
benefit from low wages and maintain competitiveness. Multinationals from China do not 
have the same incentives to do so as wages in China are already relatively low. Rather, they 
tend invest to serve local markets or extract resources. In some sectors, e.g. infrastructure and 
motorcycles, Chinese technology is more advanced than Indonesian and Chinese investors 
can benefit from combining their technology with location-specific assets. 
 
The Bank of China was established in Indonesia as early as the 1930s. Only since diplomatic 
relations between China and Indonesia were resumed in 1990, Chinese FDI started to flow 
into Indonesia. The majority of Chinese FDI is performed by state owned enterprises. It is not 
uncommon to enter through joint ventures for a number of reasons: the investment law in 
Indonesia does not permit full foreign capital investment in certain economic activities, e.g. 
the Chinese investor in PT Ocean Global Shipping owns only 49 percent of the shares; (b) to 
avoid conflicts with Indonesian laws and regulations; (c) to better negotiate the sometimes 
difficult business environment in Indonesia.
v
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 Table 3 Realized FDI from China by sector, 1966-2007 (number of projects) 
 
1995 1996 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
PRIMARY 
            Mining 
      
1
 
1 2 2 6
SECONDARY 
            Food Industry 
     
1 
  
1 
  
2 
Textile Industry 
    
2 
    
1 2 5 
Wood Industry 
      
2 
 
1 
  
3 
Paper, Paper Products & Printing 
      
2 
    
2 
Chemical & Pharmaceutical Industry 1 2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 1 8 
Rubber & Plastic Goods Industry 
     
1 
     
1 
Non Metallic Mineral Products Industry 
  
1 
        
1 
Basic Metal, Metal Products, Machineries & 
Electronics Industry 
      
1 
 
2 5 1 9 
Transport & Transport Equipment Industry 
   
1 
  
3 
 
1 
 
3 8 
Other Industry 
       
1 
   
1 
TERTIARY 
            Construction 
      
1 
    
1 
Trade & Reparation 
    
1 1 2 2 5 2 11 24 
Transport, Storage & Communication 
   
1 1 1 1 
    
4 
Real Estate, Industrial Estate & Office Building 
  
1 
        
1 
Other services 
 
1 
     
2 1 
 
2 6 
TOTAL 1 3 2 3 4 5 13 6 12 11 22 82 
 
Table 4 Realized FDI from China by sector, 1966-2007 (USD million) 
 
1995 1996 1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
PRIMARY 
            Mining 
      
0.5 
 
0.2 1.5 0.8 3.0 
SECONDARY 
            Food Industry 
     
3.9 
  
7.8 
  
11.7 
Textile Industry 
    
9.1 
    
8.7 14.7 31.9 
Wood Industry 
      
54.7 
 
0.2 
  
54.8 
Paper, Paper Products & Printing 
      
3.3 
    
3.3 
Chemical & Pharmaceutical Industry 1.4 3.3 
 
0.5 
 
0.5 
 
1.6 
 
2.3 2.6 12.1 
Rubber & Plastic Goods Industry 
     
0.3 
     
0.3 
Non Metallic Mineral Products 
Industry 
  
6.9 
        
6.9 
Basic Metal, Metal Products, 
Machineries & Electronics Industry 
      
2.5 
 
7.6 18.3 1.0 28.8 
Transport & Transport Equipment 
Industry 
   
2.0 
  
3.9 
 
13.0 
 
6.1 24.1 
Other Industry 
       
0.7 
   
0.7 
TERTIARY 
            Construction 
      
0.1 
    
0.1 
Trade & Reparation 
    
0.2 0.1 0.3 2.0 11.6 0.8 4.6 18.8 
Transport, Storage & Communication 
   
0.2 0.6 1.5 18.8 
    
21.2 
Real Estate, Industrial Estate & Office 
Building 
  
1.0 
        
1.0 
Other services 
 
1.0 
     
3.8 5.3 
 
0.3 1.5 
TOTAL 1.4 4.3 7.9 2.7 9.8 6.3 83.3 8.1 45.5 31.5 28.9 229.0 
 
Looking at the statistics from the Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) discussed in the 
methodology section, total realized Chinese FDI in Indonesia from 1966 to 2007 amounted to 
82 projects (see Table 3) with a value of USD229 million (Table 4).
vi
 According to the 
BKPM data, the first Chinese FDI that came to Indonesia was a single investment project in 
1995 with a value of USD1.4 million in the chemical & pharmaceutical industry in East Java. 
Until the year 2003 the number of investment projects was less than ten projects yearly, but 
the number started to increase and reached its peak in 2007 with 22 projects. The value of 
investments increased rapidly and reached its peak in 2003 amounting to USD83.3 million 
but then dropped sharply to USD28.9 million by 2007. By regional distribution, the highest 
value of investment took place in Central Kalimantan with USD51.6 million, although it was 
only for one project in the wood industry. Next came Banten with USD51.3 million and 
Jakarta with USD45.5 million. Other provinces absorbed only small value of investments. 
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Realized Chinese FDI in the manufacturing sector 1966-2007 total 40 projects worth 
USD174 million (see tables over). Hence the majority of Chinese FDI in Indonesia by value 
is in the manufacturing sector. The value of investments first increased from USD1.4 million 
in 1995 to its peak of USD63.6 million in 2003 but then declined to USD23.7 million in 
2007. Most of the investment projects are located in Java, particularly in Jakarta. The metal, 
metal products, machineries & electronic industry is leading in the number of projects with 
nine projects, followed with each eight projects in the chemical & pharmaceutical industry 
and the transport equipment industry. In terms of investment value, the highest investment 
value was in the wood industry with a total of USD54.8 million, followed by the textile 
industry with USD31.9 million, the basic metal, metal products, machineries & electronics 
industry with USD28.8 million and the transport & transport equipment industry with 
USD24.1 million. The absorption in the other industries was relatively small. 
 
On 26 September 2002 an „Energy Forum‟ between Indonesia and China was established. 
This constitutes an umbrella agreement for China to undertake investments in the field of 
energy in Indonesia. The rapid growth of the Chinese economy increases a high demand for 
energy and to secure energy supply from abroad. China has three big oil companies, where 
the government holds the majority shares, the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC), the China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), and the China national Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC). The other shareholders are private individuals and institutions. 
CNOOC, established in 1982, is a joint venture with foreign capital and its activities is in 
offshore oil exploration. Sinopec, established in 1983, is a holding company encompassing 
the whole area of petrochemical industry like oil refinery, oil derivative products, 
petrochemical products, chemical fertiliser, synthetic fibre and rubber. CNPC or Petro China, 
established in 1988, is engaged in the upstream activities of oil and gas exploration (Wibowo 
and Kusuma 2009). 
 
All three oil companies are presented in Indonesia. They did not establish new ventures in 
Indonesia, but rather acquired shares from existing foreign oil companies. CNOOC was 
already active in Indonesia since 1993, when it bought 32.5 percent shares of the oil fields in 
the Malacca Strait and another 6.93 percent in 1995. In April 2002, the company acquired the 
shares of five of the seven oil field blocs owned by Repsol YPF, a Spanish oil company. 
These are in the offshores of West Java (37 percent), Southwest Sumatra (65 percent), West 
Madura (25 percent), Poleng (50 percent) and Blora in Central Java (17 percent). A big 
project on the development and exploration of natural gas was signed on 26 September 2002 
between the government of Indonesia and CNOOC. CNOOC will invest USD8.5 billion in 
the project located at Tanguh, Papua Province, and the liquefied natural gas will be exported 
to Fujian Province and Shanghai in China. The agreement will take effect in 2008. Petro 
China in 2004 obtained the rights to operate an oilfield in Sukowati. CNOOC in 2007 with 
PT SMART from Indonesia and a Hong Kong firm agreed to invest a capital of USD5.5 
billion to produce biofuel. In its further expansion CNOOC acquired 50 percent of the shares 
of Husky Energy to develop an offshore natural gas field in the Madura Strait, in East Java. 
On the other hand Sinopec in Juli 2005 signed a co-operation contract with the Indonesian 
government to explore oil production in Tuban, East Java. The project is planned to start in 
2007. The third Chinese oil company, the CNPC, together with Petro China in April 2003 
have acquired 30 percent shares of Amerada Hess Indonesia Holding Ltd. to explore an 
oilfield in Jabung, Sumatra. (Wibowo and Kusuma 2009). 
 
Still another private Chinese oil company, the CITIC Seram Energy Ltd., in 2006 acquired 50 
percent of the shares of KUTEC, a Kuwaiti oil company. The company operates on the island 
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of Ceram in the Moluccas. The CITIC mother company started as a private bank in China, 
but expands to many fields of economic activities.  
 
The Synohydro Corporation, founded in 1950, is the largest company in China in water 
conservation and hydropower industry. Its main business covers investment, project 
financing, consultation services, construction, mechanical and electrical plant manufacturing 
and installation, construction equipment manufacturing and trading in the industry of water 
conservation, power generation, expressway, railway, harbour and sea-routes, airport, 
municipal public utility and building. It now operates world-wide. In 2007, Sinohydro 
expands its investments from hydropower and coal power projects to wind power, real estate, 
infrastructure and water supply projects (www.sinohydro.com). On 25 April 2008, the 
Synohydro Corporation signed a contract with the Indonesian electricity company PLN to 
build a coal-burning electricity power plant in the province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
with a capacity of 200 MW (Krismantari 2008) 
 
The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Indonesia) Co. Ltd. was established on 28 
September 2007 as a foreign exchange licensed commercial bank. It now has 12 branches 
located in three big cities in Indonesia, Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya. The ICBC took over 
90 percent of the shares of an Indonesian private commercial bank, the Bank Halim, owned 
by an Indonesian Chinese (International Herald Tribune 2007).     
 
In the manufacturing industry, China often exports their final products to Indonesia rather 
than to undertake investments as Indonesia offers few cost advantages over China and trade is 
liberalized. Chinese products are generally of low to medium quality and they can capture 
market shares because of the low prices (cf. Tarmidi 2003: 205). 
 
In the car assembling industry, some companies are producing for one principal only like 
Honda, Hyundai Indonesia Motor, and the Krama Yudha Group who is only producing for 
Mitsubishi. But some other companies, although they are producing for a main principal they 
are also assembling other car brands as well. E.g., the main principal of the Astra Group is 
Toyota Motor, but they also assemble other car brands like MAN, Renault, Nissan, and 
Daihatsu. The PT Gaya Motor, an affiliate of PT Astra International, assembles BMW, Isuzu 
and Peugeot cars (see Gaikindo 2001). The entrance of Chinese cars in Indonesia is of very 
recent date and the domestic market is already dominated by mostly Japanese brands. Back in 
July 2007, the Indonesian company PT Gaya Motor with full capital investment launched the 
Chinese Geely car. However, the production volume remains very small, because the brand is 
a latecomer and competition is very stiff. The Geely International in China has already 20 
years experience behind them in the automotive industry and has strategic alliances with 
Daewo from Korea and Maggiora from Italy. Its production capacity is 650,000 units 
annually.  
 
Another company, the Indomobil Group, whose main principal is Suzuki, is also producing 
other car brands like Hino, Volkswagen, Volvo, Ssangyong, Audi, Nissan, and Mazda 
(Gaikindo 2001). But since 2006 the company is also assembling the Chery passenger cars 
from China, followed in 2007 by Foton trucks, and since early 2008 the double cabins SUV 
by the name of Great Wall. These are all domestic investments by Indomobil based on 
technical assistance agreement with the mother companies in China. The Chinese car 
producers are all state-owned enterprises and they do not invest any capital in the Indomobil 
enterprise. Indonesia is chosen as the production base for the Chery car for the ASEAN 
market. The market for Chinese automobiles in Indonesia is still very small. Production 
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targets by Indomobil for 2009 are 1,000 units of Foton trucks, 250 units of Great Wall SUVs 
and 1,500 units of Chery cars. Sales of Chery personal cars in Indonesia increased from 269 
units in 2006 to 759 units in 2007.  
 
The Indomobil Group was originally fully owned by an Indonesian Chinese businessman but 
during the financial crisis in 1998 the company ran into financial difficulties and had to sell 
most of its shares to the Japanese. Now the Indonesian partner is only a minority shareholder 
in the company. The reason for the Indonesian shareholder to produce Chinese cars is one of 
long-term strategic consideration. The Indonesian partner has no power anymore in the policy 
of the Indomobil Group, all are now in the hands of the Japanese top executives. The 
Indonesian partner founded three separate independent companies for each Chinese car 
brand, where they have full control over it and can determine the future of the three brands. 
Hence they can reduce their dependence on the Japanese partners. To be economically viable, 
a car producer must fulfill a minimum scale of production capacity and therefore it needs a 
large amount of capital investment. This is a highly risky investment venture, as the domestic 
market is already dominated by many foreign brands from Japan, Europe/Germany, the US 
and Korea. But for an existing large car assembling plant like the PT Indomobil, it has 
already a relatively large production plant, has capital and disposes of a well-established 
marketing channel chain, besides a long time experience in production and sales. The 
initiative for assembling Chinese cars in Indonesia came from the Indonesian side, since the 
Chinese carmakers themselves were not interested in investing directly in Indonesia.
vii
 The 
reason the Chinese brand owner does not invest directly in Indonesia might be that building a 
new assembling plant would involve high investment costs, whereas the future market is 
uncertain due to intense competition in the automobile market in Indonesia. Another reason 
might be that by joining a local assembling plant it can capitalize on the existing sales 
network and marketing system. 
 
The Indonesian government protects the automotive assembling industry in the country with 
relatively high import tariffs for completely built-up (CBU) vehicles, whereas imports of 
completely knocked-down (CKD) kits enjoy a much lower tariff, so that there is less 
incentive to import automotive vehicles in CBU condition. While before 1999, imports of 
CBU cars were prohibited and only cars in CKD condition could be imported, today cars in 
CBU condition may also be imported. However, import duty for CBU cars is much higher 
than for CKD cars. In September 2007, the Indonesian government increased the tariff rate 
for CBU passenger cars with a capacity of over 1,800cc from 20 percent to 45 percent. On 
the other hand it reduced the tariff rate for imports of cars over 2,500cc in CKD condition 
from 45 percent to 20 percent (Kompas daily news, 29 October 2007). 
 
Unlike the car assembling industry, the motorcycle assembling companies in Indonesia have 
only one principal and are producing only for that principal, e.g. like Honda, Yamaha, 
Suzuki, and others. The Chinese motorcycle companies in Indonesia also do not form 
alliances with the existing motorcycle assembling companies (Tarmidi & Gammeltoft 2008: 
Attachment 3). This may also be related to the fact that the capital investment value required 
in these plants is much less than in the car manufacturing industry.  
 
Assembling of CKD and importation of CBU motorcycles from China started around 1995. 
At the beginning there were over 100 firms in the business and could sell quite a large 
number of motorcycles, because the price is very low. Importer firms were exclusively 
owned by Indonesian Chinese, as were the motorcycle assembling companies. Only few of 
these assembling companies were FDI from China, and few were also joint ventures with 
 18 
local Chinese, but the vast majority of the companies were fully owned by Indonesian 
Chinese. Motorcycles from China found a market niche in particular during the financial 
crisis from 1997 to around 1999 but there are no records as to their activities in Indonesia. 
But pretty soon many of them were closed due to failing sales: though they could offer low 
prices, the quality was notoriously bad. There is an Indonesian Motorcycle Industry 
Association consisting of Japanese producers, but none of the Chinese motorcycle assemblers 
are members of this association. Supposedly there is an Association of Indonesian 
Motorcycle Producers consisting of around 20 members, all of them producing Chinese 
motorcycles, however not much is known about their location or their activities.  
 
Most of the companies are fully owned by Indonesian Chinese, notably former motorcycle 
agents. One of the very few fully-owned Chinese assemblers is the Lifan Indonesia. Their 
plant is located is the eastern part of Jakarta, employing some 200 workers. The company 
started production in 2000 producing 30,000 motorcycles per year. But sales fluctuated from 
10,000 units in 2001, 30,000 units in 2002 and dropped back to 10,000 units in 2003. The 
parent company, the Chongqing Lifan & Honda Motorcycle Manufacture Co., Ltd., was 
founded in 1992 and is located in Chongqing, China. Though relatively new, Lifan produced 
1.5 million motorcycle engines in 2000 and exports its products to around 70 countries in the 
world (Tarmidi 2003: 192).  
 
Some of the companies are joint ventures with local Indonesian Chinese. The local partners 
are usually agents of existing Japanese motorcycle brands. So the Chinese investors capitalize 
on the knowledge of local market conditions and sometimes on the existing marketing 
networks, but they do not form alliances with the established motorcycle assembling 
companies. One of them is the PT Buana Jialing Sakti Motor, a joint venture between the 
China Jialing Industrial Co., Ltd., and the PT Buana Jaya Makmur Sakti Motor from 
Indonesia with each 50 percent shares. The company was established in 1996 and started 
production in 1997. The company imports motorcycle components and parts in CKD 
condition from China and uses also local components. The plant is located on two sites in the 
western part of Jakarta. The company employed around 200,000 workers in 2002 with a 
production capacity of 10,000 units per month and actual production of around 5,000 units. 
The parent company in China started producing motorcycles in 1979 and in 2000 the 
company produced 2 million units per year and claims to be the fourth largest motorcycle 
producer in the world. Another joint venture company is the PT Sanex  Qianjiang Motor 
International, where the Chinese investor is a minority shareholder. The distribution of the 
shares is as follows: PT Sanex Motor Indonesia from Indonesia (65 percent), and the rest is 
divided between Qianjiang from China, Lion Group from Malaysia and CPI Motor from 
Taiwan. The plant has a production capacity of 6,000 units/month and is located in the 
western part of Jakarta, in the province of Banten. But actual production in 2002 was between 
2,500 and 3,000 units a month with a total of some 500 employees, 300 of which were 
working in the factory (Tarmidi 2003: 189-192).  
 
Today, the euphoria for cheap Chinese motorcycles in the late 90s and early 2000s is gone 
and consumers have realized that the quality of most of the brands is very low. For some 
brands spare parts are not available and there is a lack of after sales service and financing 
facilities. Most of the assembling plants and some brands like Sanex, Jialing and Lifan appear 
to have suspended production. Some surviving brands known are Viva produced by Vivamas 
Qingqi Motor Indonesia, a fully owned Indonesian Chinese company, and another brand, 
TPS. Vivamas survives because it is probably the only company in Indonesia producing 
three-wheel motor vehicles with a small cart attached at the back, which is very handy for 
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small shops in transporting small merchandise for short distances. The company also still 
produces a small number of motorcycles.  
 
For the following reasons, Chinese automotive producers do not invest full scale in 
Indonesia: (a) they are latecomers in the Indonesian automobile and motorcycle industry, 
which is already overwhelmingly dominated by well established Japanese brands. They are 
not able to compete head on in the market; the best they can achieve is to win a relatively 
small market niche. The agent importers then set up distribution and services centres in 
several cities in Indonesia to support their sales operations, because they know the local 
market conditions better. Therefore, it does not make sense for the Chinese company to invest 
heavily in this sector. (b) Typically it is the agent importer, who first imports the products in 
completely- built-up (CBU) condition, who then subsequently builds an assembling plant 
because they have already established related distribution and services centers. The importers 
are generally of ethnic Chinese. (c) The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), of 
which Indonesia is a member, has signed a Free Trade Agreement with China. So trade has 
become more open and free between China and Indonesia, and Chinese goods are highly 
price competitive in the world market; the incentive to look for other low-wage countries is 
limited. 
INDONESIAN POLICY VIS-À-VIS CHINESE FDI 
Generally, Indonesia‟s FDI regime is very open. In 1967 Indonesia for the first time enacted 
Law No. 1 on Foreign Investment and in 1968 Law No. 6 on Domestic Investment. Before, 
approvals for investments were being extended by individual ministries and foreign 
investments were being treated differently than domestic investments in terms of facilitation 
and field of activities. The fields of activities for foreign investments were much more 
restrictive than that for domestic investments. The goal of the two laws is to provide a one-
stop service to investors in order to simplify investment application and approval, and to this 
purpose the government founded the Investment Co-ordinating Board (BKPM).  
 
In compliance with the Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) agreement in the WTO, 
Indonesia has in 2007 revised and enacted a new Law No. 25 on Investment, indicating that 
there should be no discrimination between domestic investment and foreign investment. 
Article 4 paragraph 2a stipulates that domestic as well as foreign investment will receive 
equal treatment in terms of taxation and regulations, however there will be unequal 
opportunities as certain economic activities are closed for FDI (Article 12 paragraph 2b). To 
that purpose the government issues a negative investment list. The negative investment list 
distinguishes six categories of investment: (1) Sectors that are closed for domestic as well as 
foreign investments; (2) Sectors that are open for domestic investors; (3) Sectors that are 
open for foreign investors under certain prerequisites; (4) Sectors that are open for foreign 
investments in form of joint ventures, in which the minimum capital share of local partner(s) 
is fixed at 5 percent; (5) Sectors that are open for local small-scale investors; (6) Sectors that 
are open for foreign investments, when they have a joint venture with local medium- and 
large-scale enterprises.  
 
Foreign relations between China and Indonesian have fluctuated from amicable (under 
President Sukarno) to antagonistic (under President Soeharto) to laissez-faire (under 
Presidents Habibie and Sukarnoputri) to activist (today). Indonesia had amicable foreign 
relations with China under Sukarno. Diplomatic relations were broken off in 1967 when 
Soeharto came to power and were not restored until 1990. Even after 1990 relations were 
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uneasy, also due to the plight of the Indonesian Chinese. Only when Abdurrahman Wahid 
became President in 1999, have relations became more positive - also reflected in increasing 
flows of investment, trade and finance. The increasing engagement of Chinese MNCs, many 
of them state owned, in Southeast Asia is also reflective of a broader regionalist agenda with 
closer integration between Asian nations, diplomatically as well as commercially. 
 
Indonesia-China political and economic relations are generally good, though at times 
hampered by atrocities against the local Chinese minority and by the Indonesian 
government‟s position to Taiwan. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were 
established in late March 1950. This diplomatic relationship was suspended on October 31, 
1967, when the Chinese government was accused of supporting and sympathizing with the 
alleged Indonesian Communist Party coup in 1965. Twenty five years later, on August 1990, 
diplomatic relations were resumed. The peak of bilateral relations was reached when 25 April 
2005 both sides signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement on the occasion of President Hu 
Jintao visit to Indonesia. The Agreement consists of three pillars: political and security co-
operation, economic and development co-operation, and social cultural co-operation. (Hadi 
2009: 58).   
 
From the Indonesian side, the government is interested to attract as much FDI as possible 
from abroad including from China. This agenda was pursued e.g. during the visit of President 
Yudhoyono to China in late July 2005 and Vice President Jusuf Kalla in June 2007. On the 
other hand China is more interested in having open trade than in undertaking investments 
because prices of Chinese products are very competitive in the world market. During the Vice 
President‟s visit, China prepared a loan of USD800 million for various projects in Indonesia. 
A loan of USD250 million is reserved for the construction of the Jatigede dam in West Java, 
and the rest would be used to build a 517 kilometer-long double-track railway project in 
Central Kalimantan, the transportation of 2.6 metric tons of LNG (liquefied natural gas) from 
Papua to Fujian Province, and the building of thermal power plants and road construction 
(Abdussalam 2007). 
 
Interests from Chinese firms to enhance economic relations with Indonesia are relatively 
high. It was reported by a local newspaper, that 400 Chinese entrepreneurs from Guangdong 
and Indonesian businessmen have signed in Jakarta on September 5, 2008, a memorandum of 
understanding to cooperate in 20 investment projects in Indonesia worth USD597 million. 
The joint projects will be in the sectors energy, electricity, plantation estates, agriculture, 
foodstuff, infrastructure development, and trade. (Kompas daily news, 5 September 2008). 
However, there are none in the manufacturing sector. Again in late August, 100 business 
representatives and 20 government officials, led by the governor of Henan Province were 
visiting Indonesia to set up business contacts (Kompas daily news, 25 August 2009).  
 
A free trade area between China and the ASEAN-6 (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) has been established. The framework agreement for 
the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA) was signed on 4 November 2002 in 
Phnom Penh, Cambodia. In 2005 an agreement for trade in goods went into effect, in 2007 
one for services, and in 2010 an agreement on investments. This implies that more investment 
opportunities will be opened and there will be more open and free flow of capital between the 
member countries in the region. The objective of the Agreement is to strengthen and enhance 
economic, trade and investment co-operation between both parties, and to create a 
transparent, liberal and facilitative investment regime. 
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The Investment Agreement implies that foreign investments from China to ASEAN countries 
will increase and vice versa. Though this is a positive development it is not certain yet that 
the outflow of Chinese investments will primarily go to Indonesia. Many sources predict that 
future Chinese outward foreign investments will increase significantly but this is also likely 
to be contingent on the extent to which Indonesia improves its investment and business 
environment. On the other hand, with the Trade in Goods Agreement in place, trade in goods 
will also increase as trade impediments are being abolished. As trade becomes more open, it 
will have an adverse effect on market-penetration oriented investments from China as most 
products are produced more cheaply in China itself.  
THE FIRM-LEVEL SURVEY  
The following section reports the findings from the firm-level survey of Chinese invested 
companies in Indonesia, which was conducted from February to August 2009. Among the 15 
Chinese invested companies, which responded to the questionnaire, four are engaged in 
mining & quarrying activities, five in manufacturing industries, and two firms in each of the 
three other sectors: construction, transportation & storage, and financial & insurance services 
(see Table 5). I.e. well over half of the firms are in either mining & quarrying activities or in 
manufacturing industries. 
 
Table 5  Sectoral distribution of firms in the sample (number and percent) 
Sector Firms Percent 
Mining & quarrying 4 27 
Manufacturing 5 33 
Construction 2 13 
Transportation & storage 2 13 
Financial & insurance activities 2 13 
Total 15 100 
Note: coded according to ISIC Rev.4 
 
The location of the firms is spread out in many provinces in Indonesia but highly 
concentrated in the capital city, Jakarta. Six out of 13 firms reporting their location are 
located in Jakarta. The firms were inquired about the location of the main production facility. 
If this is outside Jakarta many firms will in addition have a central office in Jakarta.
viii
 
 
With respect to the year of establishment of the 14 firms that answered the question they are 
almost equally distributed over the years from 1992 to 2007. The earliest year of 
establishment is 1992 reported by the China National Technical Import-Export Corporation. 
Air China Ltd. reports to have first invested in 1994. These two projects may, or may not, 
initially have been branch offices rather than FDI since according to the Indonesian 
Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) data reported earlier, the first Chinese FDI entered 
Indonesia only in 1995. On the other hand BKPM data is often not accurate. 
 
The size of the firms in terms of number of employees is very mixed, the smallest being 20 
employees and the  largest 1,500 employees (N=9). Most companies are SMEs with only 
three companies exceeding 150 employees. 
 
In general the number of Chinese expatriates working in Chinese companies in Indonesia is 
modest with over half having less than 10 percent mainland Chinese among their employees 
(N=9). A single company has a share over 50 percent. The survey also reveals that mainland 
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Chinese employees are typically in management positions. Furthermore, all firms report the 
company‟s CEO in Indonesia to be mainland Chinese. 
 
The majority of the firms (ten out of 14) are wholly owned Chinese foreign subsidiaries, 
while joint ventures are a minority group (four firms). As discussed earlier ownership 
structure is sector-dependent with automobiles and motorcycles having a high incidence of 
joint ventures. Greenfield investments are the most frequent (eight firms) but acquisitions are 
also important (six firms) (N=14). 
 
The profits earned by most of the subsidiary firms surveyed are considered to be good (seven 
firms) to reasonable (three firms) (N=11). As to expectations about future profits two firms 
expect a high increase over the next three years, six firms expect an increase while the 
remaining seven do not give any opinion. 
 
The survey confirmed that Chinese FDI is dominated by state-owned enterprises: nine firms 
are wholly state-owned enterprises (N=14, see Table 6). 
 
Table 6  Company type of the parent company in China (number and percent) 
Type Firms Percent 
State-owned 9 60 
Collective-owned 1 7 
Private joint-stock 2 13 
Public joint-stock 1 7 
Regional-owned 0 0 
Sino-foreign joint venture 0 0 
Sino-foreign cooperative enterprise 0 0 
Wholly-owned foreign enterprise 1 7 
Unknown/blank 1 7 
Total 15 100 
 
The companies were inquired about the extent of parent company investment they expected 
in Indonesia over the next three years. Nine firms did not answer the question while the 
remaining six firms expect either „very much‟ or „some‟ investments  
Investments appear overwhelmingly market seeking: for four firms the main purpose of 
investing in Indonesia is to manufacture the product for the local market, four other firms are 
for distributing and selling Chinese products in Indonesia, one firm exports resources for 
export, and six other firms did not give answers (see Table 7). 
 
Table 7  Main purpose of establishing this subsidiary (number and percent) 
Purpose Firms Percent 
Manufacture for sales in Indonesia 4 27 
Manufacture for export 0 0 
Distribute and sell in Indonesia 4 27 
Extract resources for export to China 0 0 
Extract resources for export elsewhere 1 7 
Other 0 0 
Unknown/blank 6 40 
Total 15 100 
 
Market seeking is also evident from firms‟ investment motives. The motive of most firms to 
invest in Indonesia is to seek new markets (nine firms), the second most frequent answer is to 
take advantage of the Chinese government‟s „go global‟ policy and related incentives (six 
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firms). But other motives are important as well, such as reducing production costs or taking 
advantage of business contacts in Indonesia (see Table 8). 
 
Table 8  What were the motives for establishing the subsidiary (number and average rating) 
 
Firms Average 
rating (1-5) 
To seek new markets 9 4.9 
To take advantage of Chinese govt. ‘go global’ policy and related incentives 6 3.5 
To reduce production costs 4 3.3 
To take advantage of our business contacts in Indonesia 4 3.3 
To take advantage of Indonesian preferential investment policies 3 3.0 
To secure access to energy, raw materials and natural resources 2 3.0 
To follow suppliers and partners who have moved abroad 2 2.5 
To avoid saturated demand condition in the home market 2 2.0 
To avoid trade barriers in foreign markets 2 2.0 
To reduce risks (related to production interruptions, currency realignments, 
sales fluctuations, etc.) 
1 3.0 
Other 0  
 
The most important market of Chinese companies in Indonesia is business-to-business: nearly 
two-thirds of the firms report B2B to be their most important market while a quarter of the 
firms sell primarily to private consumers, and a single firm primarily exports (N=8).  
 
In addition to the postal survey, a small number of companies were visited and managers 
interviewed. A visit to PT Haier Sapporo Indonesia was particular interesting. Prior published 
case studies and research reports about Chinese Haier, the world‟s fourth largest whitegoods 
manufacturer, report that Haier‟s first investment abroad was in a factory in Indonesia in 
1996 in cooperation with an Indonesian company. However, an interview with the owner of 
this company revealed that Haier had never invested in the factory. The Indonesian company 
imported, assembled and sold Haier‟s products on the local market but Haier never supplied 
any investment capital for the venture. 
CONCLUSION 
From an occasional trickle foreign direct investment from China to Indonesia has grown 
rapidly to make China the tenth largest investor in 2008. Not only have investment flows 
grown in size, they have also become more diversified, sectorally and in motives and 
operating modes. China‟s companies ventured abroad relatively late and came to Indonesia in 
the early 1990s, picking up in significance only after the year 2000. 
 
The current study has provided a more comprehensive and precise overview over Chinese 
investments in Indonesia than previously available. It was necessary to establish such an 
overview since there were no systematic data material on Chinese investments in Indonesia to 
base the study on. Subsequently, the study established a number of important characteristics 
of these investments as detailed in the following. 
 
Chinese investment is predominantly market seeking and resource seeking. Even though 
increasing labor costs have begun to induce Chinese companies to invest in countries such as 
Laos and Vietnam, efficiency seeking is not a prominent investment motive for Chinese 
investors in Indonesia. Chinese companies do not invest in Indonesia for strategic assets. 
Rather than invest, market seeking companies may also be present through a representative 
office (shipping, finance) or an agent. While investors from Japan, US and other advanced 
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economies are often attracted by low production costs and producing for exports, Chinese 
companies are not producing for exports in Indonesia but attracted by the market provided by 
Indonesia‟s 230 million citizens. Most of the projects in the manufacturing sector are highly 
concentrated on the island of Java while investments in extractive activities are located in the 
provinces home to the deposits. 
 
Most Chinese FDI flows into the manufacturing sectors. The motorcycle industry for 
example has been a target for Chinese investments. During the years 1997 to 2000 there were 
over 100 brands in the motorcycle assembling industry in Indonesia. Most of the companies 
do not involve FDI but are alliances with companies owned by Indonesian Chinese, often 
established at the initiative of the Indonesian side. Other companies are joint ventures with 
Indonesian Chinese and only a few are wholly owned Chinese subsidiaries. The partners in 
Indonesia are not preexisting motorcycle assembling firms. This is contrary to the automobile 
assembling industry where local partners are already existing assembling companies run by 
Indonesian Chinese. 
 
Looking more closely at Chinese invested companies in Indonesia reveals a broader variety 
of activities than one might initially expect. In addition to the straightforward presence in 
natural resources, automobile industries, electronics, and telecommunications there is also a 
large presence of Chinese companies in shipping & air transport, finance & insurance, and 
construction & engineering. The latter category of investment has increased significantly in 
recent years. Chinese construction and engineering firms which have built up capabilities in 
their home markets, submit cost-competitive bids on Indonesian tenders on infrastructure 
such as dams, bridges, railways, power plants etc., often with construction financed by loans 
from the Chinese government. 
 
The increasing investments in sea and air transport and in finance and insurance reflect that 
Chinese investments are becoming part of a broader and more systemic drive of overseas 
expansion involving a set of complementary Chinese industries rather than isolated individual 
investment projects as was the case initially. 
 
Unlike FDI from other developing countries, due to the past economic system many Chinese 
multinationals are big state or regional owned enterprises. The emergence of private 
enterprises is relatively recent, though some manage to become big enterprises also. China‟s 
foreign investments in Indonesia are by mixed entities, some are state- or regional 
government-owned enterprises and also some are private firms. In case of joint ventures, their 
local partners are mostly local Chinese, except in the infrastructure, mining and energy sector 
where their local partners are exclusively Indonesian state-owned enterprises. 
 
As in most other domains of Indonesian economic life the ethnic issue is prominent in the 
operating modes of Chinese invested enterprises. The study confirmed an assumption that 
Chinese overseas investments are to a large extent channeled through Chinese overseas 
business networks and that mainland Chinese companies establish themselves in cooperation 
with local ethnic Chinese. The importance and roles of these networks vary between different 
types of investments projects. The study also revealed that a number of investment projects 
come about at the initiative of local Indonesian Chinese businessmen who travel to China 
with the purpose of finding suitable Chinese business partners, often in the region from which 
their family originates. In these cases the „motives‟ for investment projects must be revealed 
as much on the Indonesian as on the Chinese side of the relationship. 
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In the automobile and motorcycle sectors Chinese investors often enter through alliances or 
joint ventures with Indonesian Chinese entrepreneurs. While the Chinese partner provides 
technology, brand and sometimes capital, the latter usually provides manufacturing facilities 
built up through previous production experience, ability to negotiate the local business 
environment, sales and distribution networks, and after-sales service and support.  The choice 
of entry mode is also contingent on small production volume which does not support 
establishment of new dedicated production facilities. Often the relationship is initiated by the 
Indonesian company, which initially acts as importer/agent or produces on a license. Later on 
either the relationship is terminated or the Indonesian company gradually involves the 
Chinese company closer. 
 
Without belittling the benefits brought by Chinese investments in terms of employment, 
foreign exchange and tax earnings, technological and industrial spillovers from the 
investments present themselves as modest. Due to the fact that they originate from a 
developing country themselves, are accustomed to navigating developing country 
institutional systems, and apply technologies and routines, which are attuned to the 
institutional environment in the host economy, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that 
Chinese investors could embed themselves more tightly into the Indonesian economic system 
and that more potential for virtuous spillovers could occur. However, considering the sectors, 
investment motives and operating modes of Chinese investors, the heritage of ethnic tension 
and segmentation of the economic system along ethnic lines in Indonesia, and that Chinese 
MNCs as latecomers tend to be more vertically integrated than their developed-country 
counterparts, a picture emerges where Chinese investments, at this early period of their 
internationalization, are give rise to a more modest extent of positive spillovers than investors 
from more economically advanced countries.
ix
 However, since this can in part be ascribed to 
their latecomer status and limited international experience the developmental potential may 
well increase over time. 
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Appendix 1:  The 40 largest Chinese companies and ownership ranked by outward FDI stock, 
2007 
  
Government 
owned 
1 China National Petroleum Corporation X 
2 China Petrochemical Corporation X 
3 China National Offshore Oil Corporation X 
4 China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company X 
5 China Resources (Holdings) Co.,Ltd. X 
6 CITIC Group X 
7 China National Cereals,Oils & Foodstuffs Corp. X 
8 China Mobile Communications Corporation X 
9 Sinochem Corporation X 
10 China Merchants Group X 
11 Shum Yip Holdings Company Limited X 
12 China Shipping (Group) Company X 
13 China National Aviation Holding Corporation X 
14 China National Chemical Corporation X 
15 China State Construction Engineering Corporation X 
16 SinoSteel Corporation X 
17 China Network Communications Group Corporation X 
18 Aluminum Corporation of China X 
19 GDH Limited X 
20 China Minmetals Corporation X 
21 CITS Group Corporation X 
22 Shanghai Automotive lndustry Corporation X 
23 Legend Holdings Ltd.  
24 China Power Investment Corporation X 
25 Haier Group  
26 China Metallurgical Group Corp. X 
27 Guangzhou Yuexiu Holdings Limited X 
28 China National Foreign Trade Transportation (Group) Corporation X 
29 Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation X 
30 ZTE Corporation  
31 Shanghai Overseas United Investment Co., LTD X 
32 China Huaneng Group X 
33 China Unicom Corporation X 
34 China Nonferrous Metal Mining & Construction (group) Co.,Ltd. X 
35 Shougang Corporation X 
36 China Poly Group Corporation X 
37 TCL Corporation  
38 Guangdong Province Navigation Holdings Company Limited X 
39 Xinjiang Zhongxin Resources Co.,LTD X 
40 Shenzhen Investment Holdings Co,,LTD X 
Source: „2007 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment‟, MOFCOM, for list of 
companies; ownership structure added from company websites and other sources 
Note: almost all companies are publicly listed or have a considerably share of their assets in publicly listed 
subsidiaries 
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